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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, 
by and through its DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION 
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER, ] 
BLAINE EVANS, and LINDA EVANS, ] 
Defendants/Petitioners, and ] 
MARGARET CONDLEY, ELIZABETH ) 
CONDLEY, and JOHN DOES 1-15, ; 
Defendants. ] 
l Case No. 20070009-SC 
) 20040809-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order signed and entered by the Honorable James R. Taylor on August 16, 2004 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, and the 
opinion entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on November 2, 2006 affirming that 
order in part and reversing it in part. The Utah Supreme Court granted the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on March 15, 2007 and assumes jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004). 
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JF \<F ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
kr 1. The court of appeals correctly upheld the district court's conclusion 
that road use by common law trespassers is public use for the purpose of 
satisfying the public thoroughfare dedication requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104(1) (West 2004), based on trial court's findings that (a) the Bennie 
Creek Road ("Road") was not posted against trespass and (b) respondents' 
witnesses did not use the road in violation of criminal trespass laws. 
Standard of review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). Questions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. Id. However, public thoroughfare dedication 
cases are "highly fact intensive and somewhat amorphous" and involve the 
application of facts to law. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 
1997). Mixed questions of law and fact that require a review of the trial court's 
application of statutory law to findings of fact are afforded greater deference. 
Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. Questions of fact are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard, with deference granted to the trial court. Id. And the trial 
court's application of facts to law is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
2. The court of appeals correctly concluded that the Bennie Creek 
Road was used continuously based on the trial court's findings that occasional 
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weather events, a seasonal mud bog, and summer irrigation practices did not 
preclude public use. 
Standard of review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court. 
Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
However, public thoroughfare dedication cases are "highly fact intensive and 
somewhat amorphous" and involve the application of facts to law. Heber City 
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. Mixed questions of law and fact that require a review of 
the trial court's application of statutory law to findings of fact are afforded greater 
deference. Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. Questions of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard, with deference granted to the trial court. Id. And the 
trial court's application of facts to law is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
3. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court's conclusion 
that the statutory ten-year requirement for continuous public use was satisfied by 
evidence that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used by the public 
for fifty-five years. 
Standard of review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court. 
Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
However, public thoroughfare dedication cases are "highly fact intensive and 
somewhat amorphous" and involve the application of facts to law. Heber City 
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Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. Mixed questions of law and fact that require a review of 
the trial court's application of statutory law to findings of fact are afforded greater 
deference. Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. Questions of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard, with deference granted to the trial court. Id. And the 
trial court's application of facts to law is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The text of the determinative statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (West 
2004), appears in Addendum A and in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the fall of 1996, Petitioners Randy and Donna Butler installed a steel 
gate across the Bennie Creek Road. In October of 2000, Respondents filed a 
complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County against the Butlers 
for illegally closing a public road previously abandoned and dedicated to public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (West 2004) (R. 12). 
Respondents subsequently amended the complaint on October 12, 2001 to join 
additional individuals owning property adjoining the Road, including Margaret 
Condley, Michael Condley, Elizabeth Condley, Blaine Evans and Linda Evans (R. 
199). All defendants denied the allegations contained in the amended complaint 
(R. 277). On October 1, 2003, the trial court signed an order dismissing 
Margaret, Michael, and Elizabeth Condley from the case pursuant to a stipulation 
among the involved parties (R. 1201-18). 
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The remaining parties participated in an eight-day bench trial in June of 
2004 (R. 1442-55). On June 16, 2004, the trial court issued its Memorandum 
Decision holding the Bennie Creek Road dedicated and abandoned to public use 
pursuant to § 72-5-104 (R. 1473). Respondents filed proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order on July 16, 2004 (R. 1507,1526). The trial court 
approved and executed the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order on August 16, 2004 (R. 1507-26 and Addendum B). 
Petitioners Donna and Randy Butler and Linda and Blaine Evans appealed 
this decision to the Utah Supreme Court on September 15, 2004 (R. 1620-23). 
Respondent Utah County thereafter filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on September 
27, 2004 challenging the trial court's refusal to award statutory road closure 
damages against Petitioners (R. 1631). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal and cross-appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on September 23, 2004 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004). The Utah Court of Appeals 
issued its published opinion on November 2, 2006 affirming the trial court's order 
recognizing the Bennie Creek Road as a public thoroughfare and reversing its 
order denying Utah County's request for statutory road closure damages. See 
2006 UT App 444,147 P.3d 963 (Addendum C). 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
on January 3, 2007 which was granted on March 15, 2007 (Addendum D). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In 1996, Petitioners Randy and Donna Butler erected a large metal gate 
across the Bennie Creek Road near their home in Birdseye, Utah (R. 1514,1J 31). 
They locked the gate and brought to an end a lengthy history of unrestricted 
public use of the Road (R. 1514, fl 31; R. 1513, fflj 31-33). 
The Bennie Creek Road commences in Birdseye, Utah at the junction of 
U.S. Highway 89 and continues westerly approximately 2.5 miles to the eastern 
edge of the Uinta National Forest (R. 1523, ffij 3-4). The Road continues into the 
National Forest where it provides access to a number of public camping areas, 
hiking trails, and the Nebo Loop Road (R. 1522, fl 10; R. 1516, fl 24). Portions of 
the Bennie Creek Road cross Petitioners' properties before reaching the National 
Forest (R. 1524-25, fflf 1-2). 
Sixty-five witnesses testified at trial, recalling facts and circumstances 
relative to the use and condition of the Bennie Creek Road from as early as 1925 
(R. 1523, fflj 5, 8). Earl Gardner owned what is now Petitioners Randy and 
bonna Butler's property from 1925 to 1963 (R. 1523, fl 8). During that period of 
time, the public frequently traveled the Road, and the Gardners never attempted 
to restrict or regulate that public use (R. 1523, fl 8). From 1925 until Petitioner 
Randy Butler installed a gate in 1996 to restrict public use of the Road, a wide 
variety of people traveled the Road unimpeded into the National Forest for sundry 
activities such as hiking, sightseeing, fishing, hunting, camping, horseback riding, 
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family outings, livestock operations, irrigation maintenance, law enforcement, and 
trail and road maintenance (R. 1522, fl 10; R. 1519,1J16; R- 1515,1f26). 
Although livestock control gates occasionally crossed the Road at four 
locations, the overwhelming number of witnesses testified that the gates were 
seldom closed and were never locked or posted against trespassing prior to 1980 
(R. 1522, H 10; R. 1521, 1f 12; R. 1519, If 16; R. 1517, fflf 20-21; R. 1516, Iflf 22-
23; R. 1515, 1J 28). The gates were employed to control livestock movement (R. 
1517,1f1f 20-21; R. 1516, H 23). The public continuously used the Road 
whenever necessary or convenient for a period in excess of ten years (R. 1515, 
1J28). 
Travel on the Road was impacted from time to time by weather, springs 
and a bog during wetter times of the year, and by irrigation practices in the 
summer (R. 1522, 1J 11; R. 1518,1f 18). Nevertheless, the public continuously 
traveled the Road by motor vehicle, wagon, horseback and foot despite these 
seasonal conditions (R. 1522, If 11; R. 1518, U 18; R. 1515, If 27). Utah County 
and the United States Forest Service regularly graded and improved the Road 
beginning in the 1950s and extending into the late 1990s (R. 1516, If 25). The 
maintenance improved travel on the Road (R. 1516,1f 25). 
A number of "No Trespassing" signs and yellow and orange paint markings 
were placed on trees and fence posts paralleling the length of the Road crossing 
Petitioners' properties (R. 1518, If 19). None of the signs or markings explicitly or 
-7-
implicitly identified the Road as closed to public travel (R. 1518, % 19). The 
physical juxtaposition, frequency and content of the signs and paint markings 
clearly posted the property adjacent to the Road against trespass as required in 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 (West 2004), but they did not prohibit public use of 
the Road (R. 1518,1(19). 
Although the Road had been continuously used by the public as a 
thoroughfare for over seventy years, Petitioners Randy and Donna Butler 
constructed a steel gate across the Road in 1996 and locked it shut (R. 1514, 
1131). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioners' claim that the trial court and court of appeals erred in 
considering the testimony of alleged trespassers is without merit. The trial court 
carefully considered and weighed all the evidence presented at trial regarding 
"No Trespassing" signs and painted fence posts along the Bennie Creek Road, 
and concluded they posted the property adjacent to the Road against trespass, 
not the Road itself. The public users of the Road were not in criminal trespass. 
Petitioners have neither directly challenged this finding nor have they marshaled 
any evidence to that end. 
They claim instead that the trial court and the court of appeals erred in 
considering use by common law trespassers as public use for purposes of 
dedicating the Road to the public. Common law trespass is a necessary element 
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for establishing a public dedication under § 72-5-104, and not a legal theory upon 
which to defeat it. To create a public thoroughfare by use, travel upon a road 
must be non-permissive. Common law trespass, on the other hand, enjoins any 
type of non-permissive use of another's property. To suggest common law 
trespass invalidates uses otherwise qualified to establish a public thoroughfare is 
to state non-permissive use can never create a public dedication. Such a legal 
interpretation eviscerates § 72-5-104 and leaves it without legal effect. 
Accordingly, it cannot serve as a basis to disturb the court of appeals' affirming 
the trial court's findings and conclusions on this issue. 
Alternatively, the mere presence of "No Trespassing" signs and painted 
posts along a road does not itself enjoin the dedication of a public thoroughfare 
where the public continuously uses the road despite the signs and the landowner 
takes no further action to control the non-permissive use. 
Petitioners further challenge the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial 
court's finding that the Bennie Creek Road was used "continuously" as a public 
thoroughfare for ten years. While Petitioners recognize a duty to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and conclusions on "continuous 
use," they maintain there is no evidence in the record supporting them. Contrary 
to Petitioners' contention, the record is replete with testimony from fifty of 
Respondents' witnesses who used the Road as often as they found it convenient 
and necessary or who observed such use by others. 
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The testimony collectively established extensive public use of the Road 
from the mid-1920s to 1996 when Respondent Butler obstructed travel with a 
locked steel gate. The Road was used to access the National Forest during all 
seasons of the year for a variety of purposes, including hunting, fishing, camping, 
hiking, picnicking, horseback riding, sightseeing, and livestock operations. 
Although irrigation practices and naturally occurring springs created muddy 
conditions from time to time, public travel on the Road nonetheless continued by 
vehicle, horseback, and on foot. 
Continuous use can be established with modes of transportation other than 
a sedan. It is not the character of the vehicle or the mode of transportation that 
determines continuous use, but reasonable passage upon the road by any 
means. Roads are reasonably passable even when irrigation practices, weather, 
or other natural conditions render the road temporarily impassible to some forms 
of transportation. Moreover, these conditions were not deployed by the 
landowners to prevent public use of the Road. They were simply collateral 
conditions that temporarily impacted some forms of transportation, but they did 
not stop public use of the Road. Given the clear and convincing evidence before 
the trial court, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's findings 
and conclusions on continuous use. 
Lastly, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's 
identification of a fifty-five year period over which the Bennie Creek Road was 
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used continuously as a public thoroughfare as satisfying the ten-year public use 
requirement in § 72-5-104. The trial court found by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Road was used continuously as a public thoroughfare from 
1925 to 1980. The dedication statute requires that continuous use be established 
for ten years. If ten years of use is the required minimum, fifty-five years of 
continuous use certainly satisfies the requirement, and a court is under no 
obligation to specifically identify a ten-year subset of the larger period. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT IN DEEMING USERS OF THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (West 2004) reads: "A highway is dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Petitioners assert trespassers are 
not members of the public for purposes of establishing a public thoroughfare by 
use, and that the trial court and court of appeals erred by not applying common 
law trespass principles to the dedication statute. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Bennie Creek Road Was 
Not Posted Against Trespass or Otherwise Closed to Public Use. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order plainly 
shows that all evidence presented at trial regarding "No Trespassing" signs and 
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gates along the Bennie Creek Road was carefully considered and weighed.1 
With respect to "No Trespassing" signs, the trial court found and concluded the 
signs along the Road posted the adjacent property against trespass, not the 
Road.2 
That there was substantial testimony about signs along 
the Road... . The evidence was that the signs were 
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road 
west of the Gardner home to the forest boundary and, in 
particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present 
cattle guard. . . . Signs and painted posts along a fence 
running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical 
HI juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence 
| j as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road 
r from which the signs can be seen. The signs and 
painted posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiff's 
witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel off the RoadL_ 
not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs 
stated "RoacTdosed." 
(R. 1518,1119 and R. 1511,^5). 
As for gates across the Road, the trial court found the overwhelming weight 
of evidence showed the gates were for livestock control, not locked shut or 
posted in a manner_suggesting the Roadwas closed to public use (R. 1517, Iffl 
20-21; R. 1516, fflf 22-23; R. 1515,1f 28). Based on these findings and others, 
the trial court concluded that the signs and painted posts along the Bennie Creek 
1
 A brief summary of several witnesses' trial testimony concerning 
extensive use of the Road and the absence of locked gates or signs posting the 
Road closed to public use is provided in Point II. of Respondents' brief, infra. 
2
 Petitioners fail to marshal any evidence supporting the trial court's 
Findings with respect to trespass use of the Bennie Creek Road. 
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Road/did not post the Road against trespass and, by implication, that the public 
users of the Road were not in criminal trespass (R. 1511, ]f 5). 
B. Common Law Trespass is an Essential Element in Establishing a 
Public Thoroughfare. 
Several conditions must be met for a private road to become a public 
thoroughfare under § 72-5-104:1) there must be passing or travel, 2) the use 
must be by the public, and 3) the use must not be permissive. Heber City Corp., 
942 P.2d at 311. Petitioners focus on the public use requirement, contending that 
trespassers are not members of the public. They assert that a "substantial" 
number of Respondents' witnesses were trespassers. In support of this 
argument, Petitioners cite to nine places in the record where sevenof ^/<S~£> 
Respondents' witnesses claimed to have seen "No Trespassing" signs along the 
Bennie Creek Road. Petitioners' argument, however, is flawed in two respects. 
First, seven of Respondents' fifty witnesses hardly constitute a "substantial 
number." Second, Petitioners take the testimony of these witnesses out of 
context. While each of the seven witnesses indeed testified seeing "No 
Trespassing" signs along the Bennie Creek Road during their travels, each stated 
elsewhere in his or her testimony that the content and location of the signs on the 
side of the Road led them to believe they posted the property adjacent to the 
Road, and not the Road itself (R. 1639 at 39:13-15; R. 1639 at 72:10-14; R. 1640 
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at 227:20-24; R.1640 at 287:1-7; R. 1640 at 349:1-14; R. 1640 at 379:1-7: 1641 
at 507:14-21; R. 1642 at 704:1-8). 
One must seriously question any other interpretation of the signs. If the 
Road was closed to public use, as Petitioners contend, there would be no need to 
post "No Trespassing" signs along several miles of its stretch. The more 
reasoned approach taken by the trial court, the court of appeals, and nearly every 
witness who observed the signs, was that they posted the property adjacent to 
the Road and not the Road itself. 
Petitioners suggest that common law trespassers do not qualify as the 
public for purposes of establishing a public thoroughfare, but they fail to cite any 
case law supporting this position.3 Petitioners identify the essential element of 
common law trespass as the physical invasion or wrongful entry (without 
permission) upon the property of another (Petitioners' Brief at 12). Yet Utah case 
law is clear that permissive use is insufficient to establish a public thoroughfare 
3
 Petitioners claim for the first time on appeal that trespassers do not 
constitute members of the public under § 72-5-104. Petitioners maintain that the 
trespass argument was preserved in closing argument on the final day of trial 
(See Petitioners' Court of Appeals Brief, Statement of Issues/Standards of 
Review at 6,1J1). However, the cited pages of trial transcript provide nothing 
more than a general summary of the criminal trespass statute in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-20-14, and a vague discussion of an unidentified person who allegedly 
traveled the Bennie Creek Road in trespass (R. 1646 at 1197-98). Petitioners' 
trespass discussion in closing argument was untimely, vague, inapposite, and 
lacking in legal support. By raising it for the first time on appeal, Petitioners 
waived their claim that the trial court erred by failing to consider common law 
trespass in its decision. This issue is discussed in full in Respondent Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources' Court of Appeals Brief at 12. 
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under § 72-5-104. See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
App. 1998). Petitioners' common law trespass argument is irreconcilable with a 
fundamental premise of the dedication statute: use must be non-permissive. 
Dedication under § 72-5-104 is a form of prescriptive right. It is generally 
accepted that the type of use required to acquire a prescriptive right must be 
adverse and hostile to the landowner against whom the right is asserted. See 25 
AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 55 (2005). "Adverse" and "hostile" have 
been defined as being trespassory in nature, or use without license or 
permission. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 56 (2005). 
Petitioners' common law trespass argument not only eviscerates the 
purpose of § 72-5-104 and leaves it without legal effect, it also flies in the face of 
prescriptive right jurisprudence. Accordingly, the court of appeals was correct in 
holding that Petitioners' common law trespass argument did not overcome the 
trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
C. "No Trespassing" Signs at the Side of the Road Do Not Invalidate the 
Public's Continuous Use of a Road for Purposes of Establishing 
Public Dedication. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the trial court had concluded the 
"No Trespassing" signs legally posted the Road closed to public travel, the 
undisputed evidence adduced at trial demonstrates the Road was nonetheless 
traveled extensively during all seasons of the year by a large number of users (R. 
1523,1f 8; R. 1522, ffl[ 9-11; 1521, U 12; R. 1519, ffl[ 16-17; R. 1517, HH 20-21; R. 
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1516, fflf 22, 25; R. 1515, ffl[ 26-28). In Villadsen v. Mason County Road 
Comm'n, 705 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals of Michigan 
considered the effect of "No Trespassing" and "Road Closed" signs in construing 
that State's highway-by-user statute. Like Utah's statute, the highway-by-user 
statute in Mich. Comp. Laws § 221.20 provides, in pertinent part, that a roadway 
is dedicated to public use upon ten consecutive years of open and notorious use 
by the public. Villadsen, 705 N.W.2d at 902. The evidence at trial in Villadsen 
showed the existence of "Road Closed," "Dead End," and "No Trespassing" signs 
posted on or near a disputed portion of the roadway. Id. at 905. Despite the 
signs, the Michigan court of appeals concluded the road had been dedicated to 
public use. 
[R]egardless of who installed the signs, it is clear from 
the record that they were regularly ignored by the 
members of the public who used the road in dispute 
over the years.. . . Therefore, because the public used 
the roadway, the public use element by user was 
established in spite of the existence of signs. 
Id. at 906. 
"It is firmly established under Utah law that permissive use cannot result in 
either adverse possession or dedication of private property to the public." 
Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of open, 
notorious and non-permissive use of a road is the public's continuous travel on 
that road without landowner permission and despite "No Trespassing" signs. "It is 
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[no longer] necessary to prove that the owner of [a] private road had the intent to 
offer the road to the public." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 
1099 (Utah 1995). Rather, "[t]he intention of the owner of the land to dedicate 
may be inferred from his acquiescence in its continual use as a road by the 
public." Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1981). It is the landowner's 
acquiescence to public use of a road that is dispositive, not the mere presence or 
absence of signs. A landowner who fails to take action to stop continuous public 
use of a road posted against trespass effectively acquiesces to the use, and has 
no greater legal standing to defeat a public dedication than the landowner who 
fails to post in the first place. 
The trial court in the present case specifically found and concluded that "No 
Trespassing" signs and painted posts along the Bennie Creek Road posted the 
adjacent property against trespass, not the Road (R. 1518, ^ 19; R. 1511, If 5); 
that the public used the Road without permission despite the "No Trespassing" 
signs and painted posts (R. 1513-1523); and that the Road was dedicated and 
abandoned to public use (R. 1512, ^ J 2). Petitioners have identified no legal 
support for their contrary position. Therefore, both the court of appeals and the 
trial court correctly concluded that the signs and painted posts along the Bennie 
Creek Road did not invalidate the public's continuous use of the Road. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING THAT THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN 
CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE PUBLIC. 
Section 72-5-104 requires that the public must use a road continuously in 
order to dedicate it to public use. Under the continuous use requirement, 
members of the public must have been able to use the road whenever they found 
it necessary or convenient. Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809. The trial court 
meticulously listed in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
numerous examples of continuous public use of the Road spanning over seventy 
years. It concluded there was clear and convincing evidence showing the public 
continuously used the Road for the requisite period of time (R. 1515, fflf 27-28). 
A. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions on Continuous Use are 
Supported in the Record bv Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
Petitioners challenge the trial court's finding that the Bennie Creek Road 
was used "continuously" for a period of ten years. Although they refer in their 
brief to a selection of testimony concerning travel impediments on the Road, such 
as locked gates, a muddy bog, weather conditions, irrigation practices, and "No 
Trespassing" signs,4 they wholly fail to recognize that the trial court considered 
that evidence and found it overwhelmed by the volume of testimony from persons 
4
 Petitioners also claim that landowners called the county sheriff to have 
various trespassers removed from their property, suggesting the calls were to 
prevent individuals from the using Road. Both citations to the record purportedly 
supporting this statement (R. 1645 at 1073:11-17 and R. 1466) refer to instances 
where trespassers were removed from property adjacent to the Road, but not the 
Road itself (R. 1645 at 1073:11-20). 
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who nonetheless traveled the entire Road, in all seasons, between 1925 and 
1980. The trial court weighed the testimony, assigned greater credibility to some 
witnesses than to others (R. 1523, U 5), and found by clear and convincing 
evidence that the obstacles did obstruct the public's continuous use of the Road. 
To successfully challenge a finding of fact such as continuous use, 
Petitioners must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below." Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 2005 UT 22, U 25,112 P.3d 495 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
U 76,100 P.3d 1177. Petitioners must marshal "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the [petitioner] resists." AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 
168, U 10, 112 P.3d 1228 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 )).5 
Petitioners acknowledge a duty to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings on continuous use, but maintain "[t]here is no evidence to 
marshal in support of the district court's finding." Petitioners' Brief at 19. "If [a 
5
 Respondents recognize that this Court is not strictly bound to affirm the 
trial court's factual findings in the absence of marshaling, but retains the 
discretion to independently review the record as a whole and determine if the 
findings have adequate factual support. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, fflf 16-21, — P.3d 
— ,2007 WL 1452840. 
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petitioner] argues that no evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to 
marshal does not then shift to the [respondent]; rather, the [respondent] may 
prove that the [petitioner] did not meet [its] marshaling burden by presenting a 
'scintilla' of evidence in support of the ultimate finding." Parduhn, 2005 UT 22, U 
25. 
Although thoroughly summarizing the testimony of sixty-five witnesses 
over eight days of trial is legally unnecessary to provide a mere scintilla of 
evidence, a brief overview of a few key witnesses' testimony that supports the 
trial court's finding is in order. 
Madge Truman's family owned what is now Petitioner Butler's property. 
Her family owned the property when she was born in 1927 and continued to own 
it until approximately 1960 (R. 1639 at 128:13-14; R. 1639 at 129:6-14; R. 1639 
at 130:10-17). During that time, Ms. Truman witnessed continuous public travel 
on the Bennie Creek Road with no attempts made by her family or others to 
restrict or deny access to the Road (R. 1639 at 134-37). Virginia Johnson, Madge 
Truman's sister, also witnessed continuous public travel on the Road between 
1940 and 1996 with no attempts made through the use of gates, signs or required 
permission to restrict public use of the Road (R. 1639 at 145:12-13; R. 1639 at 
150-54). 
Steve Tipton testified to using the Road a half dozen times each year 
between 1948 and 1996 for purposes of hunting and fishing (R. 1639 at 160:18-
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20; R. 1639 at 162: 5-23). He traveled the Road by pickup truck and never 
encountered locked gates or signs posting the Road closed to public use, nor did 
he seek or obtain permission (R. 1639 at 163:6-18, 24-25; R. 1639 at 164:1-2; R. 
1639 at 165:19-25; R. 1639 at 166:1-3). He used the Road to travel into the 
National Forest on many occasions (R. 1639 at 167:25; R. 1639 at 168:1-4). 
Dale Gurley, a conservation officer for the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
testified to patrolling the Road in a pickup truck multiple times a week during 
summer and fall between 1968 and 1991 (R. 1640 at 298:12-19; R. 1640 at 
300:1-5). He also traveled the Road for personal use to access the National 
Forest beginning in 1958 (R. 1640 at 300:10-25; R. 1640 at 301:1-7). During his 
travels, Mr. Gurley observed other people using the Road for purposes of hunting 
and fishing, primarily on the National Forest land (R. 1640 at 307:13-25; R. 1640 
at 308:1-23). At no time did he encounter locked gates, signs posting the Road 
as closed to public use, or a requirement to seek permission to use the Road (R. 
1640 at 301-06). 
Clyde Naylor is the Utah County Engineer, Surveyor, and Public Works 
Director. He testified that Utah County regularly maintained the entire length of 
the Bennie Creek Road into the National Forest from 1974 through 1996 (R. 1639 
at 83-127). Ronald Daley testified to traveling the Road several times a year high 
into the canyon by motor vehicle between 1933 and 1996 to hunt, fish and picnic 
(R. 1641 at 485:13-20; R. 1641 at 486:1-21; R. 1641 at 487:3-7; R. 1641 at 
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491:23-25; R. 1641 at 492:1-3). He observed other people regularly using the 
Road, and never sought permission to use it himself, nor did he encounter any 
locked gates or signs posting the Road closed (R. 1641 at 488:6-25). Dewayne 
Newitt also traveled the Road eight to twelve times a year between 1952 and 
1996 (R. 1639 at 19:1-25; R. 1639 at 21:7-10). He observed other people using 
the Road in motor vehicles on many occasions, and he never sought permission 
to use the Road or encountered locked gates or signs posting the Road closed 
(R. 1639 at 25:3-20; R. 1639 at 25-32). 
Emil Mitchell, Jesse Mitchell, James Mitchell, and Lloyd Jackson all 
testified at trial for Petitioners. Emil Mitchell traveled the Road from 1937 to 1949 
(R. 1643 at 788:1-9). Jesse Mitchell traveled the Road from 1947 to 2004 (R. 
1643 at 824-26). James Mitchell traveled the Road from 1949 to 1967 and from 
1990 to 2004 (R. 1644 at 960:15-25). Lloyd Jackson traveled the Road from 
1944 to 2004 (R. 1643 at 848:14-19). Each of these witnesses periodically 
encountered livestock control gates across the Road, but they were never locked 
closed or posted with signs suggesting the Road was closed to public use (R. 
1643 at 788-90; R. 1643 at 827-29; R. 1643 at 836:2-5; R. 1643 at 838:10-20; R. 
1643 at 840:24-25; R. 1643 at 841:1-7; R. 1643 at 869-72; R. 1644 at 963:6-15). 
These men all recalled a spring and bog on the Road near the Forest Service 
boundary which made vehicular travel difficult. However, they all testified being 
able to traverse the bog with tractors, trucks, or horse and y^agon (R. 1643 at 
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778:4-12; R: 1643 at 830:13-20; R. 1643 at 841:24-25; R. 1643 at 842:1; R. 1643 
at 874:8-25; R. 1643 at 875:1-9; R. 1643 at 884-85; R. 1644 at 964:3-8). Lloyd 
Jackson and James Mitchell further testified that although they encountered 
irrigation water on the Road from time to time, the Road was still passable by 
tractor or vehicle (R. 1643 at 872:15-25; R. 1643 at 873; 1-13; R. 1644 at 964:3-
8). 
Many more witnesses testified to traveling the Bennie Creek Road into the 
National Forest without landowner permission and unobstructed by natural or 
artificial conditions, locked gates, or signs posting the Road closed to public use 
(R. 1522, fflf 10-11; R. 1521, If 12; R. 1518, fflf 18-19; R. 1517, HH 20-21; R. 
1516, HIT 22-25; R. 1515, fflf 26-28). 
Petitioners suggest the trial court's "continuous use" finding is flawed 
because a small number of witnesses testified that irrigation practices and 
seasonal water conditions made the Road impassible at times. The trial court 
specifically recognized this testimony in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, but concluded that the clear and convincing majority of witnesses 
showed the Road was traveled by foot, horse, and vehicle unrestricted by such 
conditions (R. 1518, fl 18; R. 1516,1125). 
Petitioners further challenge the trial court's "continuous use" finding, 
claiming the court failed to consider evidence of "locked gates" and "No 
Trespassing" signs on the Bennie Creek Road. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, 
-23-
the trial court carefully considered and weighed the evidence presented on gates 
and signs. The trial court concluded the "No Trespassing" signs along the Road 
posted the adjacent property against trespass, not the Road (R. 1518, ^  19). 
Similarly, the trial court concluded the overwhelming weight of evidence showed 
the gates that periodically crossed the Road were for livestock control, unlocked, 
and not posted in a manner suggesting the Road was closed to public use (R. 
1517, fflf 20-21; R. 1516, ffi[ 22-23). Based on these findings and others, the trial 
court found and concluded the Bennie Creek Road was continuously used by the 
public between 1925 and 1980 (R. 1522- 515; R. 1512-510) 
Because the trial court's findings were supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, the court of appeals did not err in sustaining them and affirming the trial 
court's findings and conclusions on continuous use. 
B. Temporary Impediments to Road Travel Caused bv Unlocked 
Livestock Gates. Winter Snow. Springtime Bogs, and Summer 
Irrigation Water Do Not Defeat Continuous Use. 
The trial court weighed and considered all the evidence presented at trial 
and concluded it demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the Road 
had been used continuously as a public thoroughfare from 1925 through 1980. 
The court of appeals recognized the trial court's role as fact-finder and deferred 
to its rulings on continuous use because they were supported in the record. 
In their analysis of the trial court's determination on continuous use, 
Petitioners mistakenly posture the trial court's findings concerning locked gates 
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on the Bennie Creek Road as a conclusion of law. The trial court did not find that 
gates were occasionally locked between 1925 and 1980 to prevent public 
passage, but it found that the minimal evidence presented on that point was 
overwhelmed by the testimony of persons who drove the Road without 
encountering locked gates (R. 1517, HH 20-21; R. 1516, HH 22-23; R. 1515, If 27-
28). Petitioners have not successfully controverted this finding of fact, nor can 
they, under a proper marshaling of the evidence-a task they have failed to 
undertake. 
"Continuous use" of a road exists when "the public, even though not 
consisting of a great many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use" of 
the road "as often at they found it convenient or necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 326 
P.2d 107,109 (Utah 1958). Travel by horse, wagon or vehicle constitutes public 
use as a matter of law in establishing a highway by dedication. Id. "A use may 
be continuous though not constant." Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 
§49 (Utah 1977). "Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. 
To the extent public travel on the Road was slowed by unlocked livestock 
control gates, seasonal bogs, irrigation practices, or inclement weather, the trial 
court found travel by foot, horse, wagon, tractor, and motor vehicle continued 
despite these conditions. As with unlocked gates and irrigation practices, 
intermissions in road use caused by weather or other naturally occurring events 
do not defeat continuous use. The Utah Supreme Court determined in Chournos 
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v. Bell, 442 P.2d 926, 927 (Utah 1968) that "temporary interruptions of [road] 
usage due to flooding, erosion and the like" did not preclude public dedication of 
the road. The court of appeals in AWINC Corp. similarly sustained the public 
dedication of a road where travel was limited by prevailing weather conditions. 
See 2005 UTApp 168 at fl 14. 
The public use dedication statute has existed in Utah law, in one form or 
another, since the late 1800s.6 During early Utah history, temporary road 
closures caused by snow, rain, flooding, erosion, or similar events were a 
common fact of life. It is untenable to believe lawmakers enacted and amended 
the public use dedication statute with the intent that temporary vehicular 
impasses caused by weather, water flows or irrigation practices breached 
continuous use and precluded dedication. 
To conclude these temporary natural events prevent dedication of a road is 
to conclude that all undeveloped roads are ineligible for dedication. Nearly all 
unimproved roads become impassable to some or all motor vehicles during 
heavy rain or snowfall. Any road over which a stream passes may be impassable 
to a motor vehicle during spring runoff or flooding. Rocky, steep, rutted, or 
6
 In Culmerv. Salt Lake City, 75 P. 620, 622 (Utah 1904), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a case involving the dedication of a road as a public 
thoroughfare under Section 2066 of 1 Comp. Laws 1888. The law was quoted in 
part as: "[a] highway shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to 
the use of the public when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
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muddy roads may be passable only by four wheel drive vehicles, ATV's, horses, 
wagons, or on foot during some or all parts of the year. 
Continuous use can be established with modes of transportation other than 
a sedan. See Boyer, 326 P.2d 107 (recognizing public use to include passage by 
wagon, horse, and vehicle and trailing livestock); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 
420 (Utah 1941) (recognizing public use to include equestrian, pedestrian, and 
vehicular travel). It is not the character of the vehicle or the mode of 
transportation that determines continuous use, but reasonable passage upon the 
road by any means. "[Rjoadways are reasonably passable even when the 
weather renders the roadway temporarily impassible." Villadsen, 705 N.W.2d at 
904. 
The common thread that ties the obstacles claimed by Petitioners to defeat 
continuous use in this case is the fact that bogs, weather, and irrigation practices 
were not tools deployed by the landowners to prevent public use of the Road.7 
They were simply collateral conditions that temporarily impacted some forms of 
transportation (R. 1522, If 11; R. 1518, If 18). 
The court of appeals correctly reviewed and disposed of Petitioners' 
challenge to the trial court's continuous use findings. The trial court found that: 1) 
public use of the Road was not blocked by locked gates between 1925 and 1980 
7
 No witness testified at trial that irrigation practices were employed to stop 
public use of the Road. 
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(R. 1515, U 28); 2) the public used the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices 
(R. 1518, U 18); and 3) the public used the Road by foot, horseback, or horse-
drawn wagon when snow and bogs occasionally interrupted vehicular travel (R. 
1522, If 11). These findings are supported by clear and convincing record 
evidence which Petitioners have failed to marshal. 
The legal requirements under § 72-5-104(1) "are highly fact dependent..., 
somewhat amorphous..." and "do not lend themselves well to close review by 
[an appellate] court." Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. The court of appeals did 
not err in granting significant discretion to the trial court's factual findings and in 
affirming its application of those facts to the dedication statute. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY A 
TEN-YEAR SUBSET OF A LONGER PERIOD OF CONTINUOUS USE. 
To establish a public thoroughfare under § 72-5-104, the public must use a 
road continuously for a period of ten years. Petitioners correctly recognize that 
use need not be constant to be continuous, as long as passage is available as 
often as the claimant finds it convenient or necessary. Richards, 559 P.2d at 
949. "Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. Based on the evidence offered 
at trial, the trial court concluded the public continuously traveled the Bennie Creek 
Road without interruption from 1925 through 1980 (R. 1518, U 18; R. 1516, ffil 22, 
25; R. 1515,H28; R. 1510,1} 7). 
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Petitioners claim the court of appeals erred in accepting the trial court's 
findings that the Bennie Creek Road was used continuously by the public for a 
period of fifty-five years. Petitioners suggest the trial court was legally obligated 
to pinpoint one ten-year period among the fifty-five years it found continuous 
public use. Petitioners cite Draper City, 888 P.2d 1097 in support of this position. 
The case is distinguishable. The trial court in Draper City granted summary 
judgment in favor of the City and declared a road a public thoroughfare. The 
Utah Supreme Court overturned the summary judgment order on the ground that 
it relied upon disputed issues of material fact. Petitioners argue the following 
quote from Draper City is precedent for their position: 
Neither [Draper City], the trial court in its findings, nor 
we have been able to pinpoint any ten-year period 
during which public use, as we have defined it, of the full 
length of the road is undisputed. Continuous use for ten 
years is required by section 27-12-89 [predecessor 
statute to Section 72-5-104]. 
Id. at 1100 (emphasis added). 
Unlike Draper City, the present action involves scrutiny of the court of 
appeals' review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by 
the trial court as the fact-finder after an eight-day bench trial. The trial court 
heard the testimony, weighed the conflicting evidence, and concluded the 
evidence presented at trial clearly and convincingly demonstrated that the Bennie 
Creek Road had been used continuously by the public as thoroughfare from 1925 
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to 1980 (R. 1516,U1[22,25; R. 1515,1128; R. 1510,1fH 7-8). Commenting on the 
witnesses and evidence presented at trial, the trial court stated that "when the 
testimony is compared to pictures, maps and other testimony, some statements 
must be given greater credibility then others" (R. 1523, If 5). The trial court 
assigned greater credibility to the numerous witnesses testifying to unimpeded, 
continuous public use of the Road than to the few that testified otherwise. 
Neither § 72-5-104 nor relevant case law requires the finder of fact to 
identify a specific ten-year subset of a larger period of time when the elements of 
dedication are satisfied.8 It is difficult to conceive that where ten years of 
continuous use is the required minimum, fifty-five years is somehow legally 
deficient. This argument is without merit and the court of appeals did not err in 
affirming the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on the 
issue of ten year of continuous use. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondents request oral argument and a published opinion in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record and the foregoing arguments, Respondents 
respectfully request this Court to affirm the court of appeal's November 2, 2006 
8
 Once a public thoroughfare is created, it continues as a public road until 
abandoned or vacated by the public authority having jurisdiction over it. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-105 (West Supp. 2006). Petitioners have never claimed or 
asserted the public status of the Bennie Creek Road to havabeen abandoned or 
vacated by competent legal authority. 
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opinion sustaining trial court's August 16, 2005 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order declaring the Bennie Creek Road abandoned and dedicated to 
public use. 
DATED this .20- day of June, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARTIN B?BUShMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 72—5-104. Public use constituting dedication—Scope 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it 
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the state 
in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to 
ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. 
Laws 1963, c. 39, § 89; Laws 1998, c. 270, § 132, eff. March 21, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 
324, § 7, eff. March 16, 2000. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 27-12-89. 
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This matter came before the Court on a bench trial consisting of June 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 
14th, and 15th, 2004. Plaintiff Utah County was represented by M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore, 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, was represented by Martin B. Bushman, Assistant Utah 
Attorney General. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and Donna Evans were 
represented by Mark E. Arnold and Scott Wiggins, of Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
The Court has reviewed the file, heard evidence at trial, issued a Memorandum Decision 
dated June 16, 2004, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of fact based upon the clear and convincing evidence 
presented at trial, the admissions of Defendants, and the addition of the Butler Family Trust: 
1. That Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler are individuals residing in Utah County, 
Utah, and are the trustees and/or successor trustees of the Butler Family Trust dated the April 
11,2002, which is the owner of record of certain real properties more particularly described 
as follows: 
COM N 89 DEG 58'01nE ALONG SEC LINE 2661.78 FT FR NW COR 
SEC 26, T10S, R3E, SLM; S 89 DEG 29'48"E 402.48 FT; S 12 DEG 
0730"Wl083.73 FT; N 84 DEG 25'25"W 491.21 FT; N 86 DEG 46f28f,W 
114.33 FT; S 77 DEG 44'11MW 78.72 FT; S 59 DEG 32'05,fW 73.23 FT; S 
48 DEG 3473MW 81.42 FT; S 66 DEG 14'50"W 60.21 FT; S 88 DEG 
10'49"W 73.18 FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 86.59 FT; N 20 DEG 49"W 444.56 
FT; N 13 DEG 12'OrW 265.17 FT; N 31 DEG 28'45"W 353.97 FT; N 61 
DEG 03'58"W 244.51 FT; N 16 DEG 47*16"W 346.47 FT; N 12 DEG 
28'38"W 368.34 FT; N 89 DEG 26'04"W 1047.86 FT; N 1 DEG 42'24"W 
672.01 FT; S 8DEG50'11ME 1330.15 FT; S 1 DEG47'12"E 1315.76 FT; N 
89 DEG 58?01"E 1330.89 FT TO BEG. AREA 56.76 ACRES. 
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ALSO: COM SW COR SEC 23, T10S, R3E, SLM; N 1 DEG 42'24"W 
671.48 FT; S 89 DEG 26'04"E 1047.86 FT; S 12 DEG 28'38"E 368.34 FT; 
S 16 DEG 47'16"E 346.47 FT; S 61 DEG 03'58"E 244.51 FT; S 31 DEG 
28,45"E353.97FT;S13DEG12,01"E265.17FT;S20DEG00*49,,E444.56 
FT; N 79 DEG 55*36"W 30.66 FT; N 81 DEG 57'45"W 80 FT; N 77 DEG 
09'25"W 503.28 FT; S 83 DEG 57'05"W 131.47 FT; N 83 DEG 2ri7"W 
364.54 FT; N 65 DEG 44'39"W 278.69 FT; N 55 DEG 47'09"W 218.59 FT; 
N 63 DEG 31 W W 325.32 FT; N 587.40 FT TO BEG. AREA 50.30 
ACRES. 
ALSO: COM. ATNE COR OF SEC 27, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S 8.90 CHS; 
N 63 3/8 W 19.86 CHS; E 17.77 CHS TO BEG. AREA 7.81 ACRES. 
ALSO: SEl/4 OF SEl/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. AREA 40 
ACRES. 
2. That Defendants Blaine Evans and Linda Evans are individuals residing in Utah County, 
State of Utah, and are the owners of record of certain real properties more particularly 
described as follows: 
BEG. 10 CHS S OF NW COR OF SEC 26, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S TO THE 
TOP OF THE "GARDNER KNOLL" 19 CHS M OR 1; N-NE ALONG 
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO A PT S 63 E 8.65 CHS TO EXISTING COR 
POST; N 63 W 8.65 CHS M OR 1 TO BEG. AREA 8.22 ACRES M OR 1. 
ALSO: COM AT SW COR. SEC. 27, R10S, R3E, SLB&M.; N 0 DEG 
10'6"W 2651.35 FT; N 0 DEG 10'6"W 2651.35 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 
2640.89 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 1467.41 FT; S 63 DEG 23'0"E 1316.6 FT; 
S 0 DEG 21'14-E 2078.28 FT; S 0 DEG 21'14"E 1333.77 FT; N 89 DEG 
42'26"W 1323.7 FT; S 0 DEG 18'27"E 1331.74 FT; N 89 DEG 3713"W 
1324.8 FT; N 89 DEG 37*13"W 2649.6 FT TO BEG. AREA 597.515 AC. 
ALSO: Sl/2 OF SWl/4 & SWl/4 OF SEl/4 OF SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, 
SLM. AREA 120 ACRES. 
ALSO: Nl/2 OF SWl/4 & Nl/2 OF SE 1/4 SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. 
AREA 160 ACRES. 
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That the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter referred to as "Road") commences at or near 
Birdseye, Utah at a junction with U.S. Highway 89, located in Section 25, Township 10 
South, Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
That from the Road's junction with U.S. Highway 89, it continues approximately 2.5 miles 
in a westerly direction through Sections 25,26,27 and 22, Township 10 South, Range 3 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian until it reaches the western edge of the Uinta National Forest. 
That over 60 witnesses testified at trial recalling facts and circumstances from as early as 
1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the 
witnesses, in view of the Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an 
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared 
to pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than 
others. 
That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church" 
and has extended west toward the Uinta National Forest since before the memory of any 
witness. 
That an ariel photo taken in 1946 clearly shows the Road extending from the highway into 
the vicinity of the national forest. 
That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family owned the property 
now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter referred to as 
"Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road 
from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time 
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the Road was traveled by the public often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict 
or deny access to the Road to any members of the public. 
That Loyd Jackson, a defense witness, testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner 
property between 1947 and 1955. He also hunted in the area every year until 1965. He 
testified that his father "made arrangements" with Mr. Gardner to move sheep across the 
Gardner's property on the way to the forest service property. Defendants insist that this 
travel was, therefore, by permission. However, Mr. Jackson did not participate in the 
discussions and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was apparent that 
the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to 
get into the cattle, as the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and arrangements 
were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to 
travel the Road. 
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, 
Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the Road 
for recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in the 1940's and 50's. 
None of them encountered locked gates on the Road or sought permission to use the Road. 
None of them were ever prevented from traveling the Road. Several, including Norris Dalton 
and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service property. 
That travel on the Road was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the Road were 
worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by 
foot, horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed off the Road. 
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Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the 
road was open and traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, interrupted 
vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water) 
in wet years and snow in the winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on 
foot, horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted. 
12. That Defendant Randy Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler), defense 
witnesses, recalled family hunting trips between 1958 and 1962 when family members 
accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt (Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's 
grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a key before traveling up the Road to 
camp just below the bog on the property now owned by Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. 
Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from approximately 1952 when, at age 7, he 
saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate and spotted a buck which he shot 
before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. Contrasted against this vivid 
and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. Only the Poulson family 
has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. Barney Newitt and 
Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about a key are both 
deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on the Poulson 
property during that time was on a side road branching south off the Road toward an old 
bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and hunted 
with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other 
witnesses testified that they traveled the Road for a variety of purposes during that time and 
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never encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to 
obtain permission from property owners to travel the Road. 
That Virgil Neeves, a defense witness, testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a 
cable gate across a cattle guard west of the Gardner home (the last home traveling west 
toward the forest service property, now occupied by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna 
Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock fight" up the 
Road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys to the 
gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to 
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be 
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area 
was usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to 
work on water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the Road and 
recalls a cable across a cattle guard on the Road to stop cars. His memories are simply 
confused and inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the Road in 
question. Further, there is evidence of a cable across a side road belonging to the Poulson 
family, and a gate and cattle guard on the Road at the Forest Boundary. 
That Mike Condley, a defense witness, testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 
1979. Although he does not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near 
the Gardner (Butler) home. However, no other witness corroborates this point and 
descriptions of locked gates by the Butler family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put 
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locked gates farther west, near the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest 
service property. 
That Elizabeth Condley, a defense witness, testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates 
were never locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her 
testimony was that she traveled the Road on horseback during the summer. There was 
nothing given to explain how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall. 
That the heaviest use of the Road was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season. 
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 
and never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the Road. 
Division of Wildlife Resources officer Gurley and Briggs patrolled the area to check hunters 
and fishermen from 1958 through 1996. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 
and 1991 sometimes observing as many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who 
had traveled up the Road to hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never 
needed permission to access the area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby, 
Forest Service supervisor, routinely traveled the Road during the 60fs and 70's for personal 
and professional purposes. Entrance to the forest service during that time was marked by 
signs. 
That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family purchased the Gardner 
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property 
with her husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her family as a 
public road during that time. No attempt was made to close the Road during that time. 
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There was testimony that one defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's 
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. However, Mr. Mendenhall 
testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was 
hunting well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering teenagers 
to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the Road. 
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the Road and that when that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However, 
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation, 
covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and convincing majority of witnesses further 
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices. 
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. The Defendants have 
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted 
yellow and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' 
witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the 
Road but not a warning against traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were 
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the Gardner home to the 
forest boundary and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard. 
Members of the public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were 
at a property line or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing 
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is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless 
of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than 
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted 
posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel 
off of the Road, not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road 
Closed." 
That there was testimony regarding four gates on the Road between U.S. Highway 89 and 
the Uinta National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate location is near the 
Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one witness described 
the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never locked. All testified 
and believed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict general travel on 
the Road. 
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire gate, 
most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. These 
witnesses believed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not 
intended to restrict travel on the Road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was 
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by 
Barney Newitt in the late 50fs and early 60's. Remnants of the gate sill exist, including a 
weathered piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too 
skimpy and too removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public 
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travel particularly in the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the Road and recalled 
no locks or road restrictions. 
22. That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient 
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that 
the gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole 
described as the remnants of a bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is 
overwhelmed by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all 
seasons between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
23. The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property, which was formerly a wire 
livestock gate, has been replaced with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and 
livestock to move through the fence when required. There has been a sign there indicating 
the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property has 
clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to 
"please close the gate." The sign is presently on the metal gate. The obstruction was 
obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle and sheep, not people. 
24. That the Road connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uinta National Forest. Paths and trails 
from the top or terminus of the Road travel over the mountain and connect to the Nebo Loop 
Road. 
25. That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were springs 
or ditches which created bogs at times making vehicular or wagon travel through or around 
the bogs difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was not restricted and 
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there was regular maintenance performed on the Road by Utah County, the United States 
Forest Service and landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest 
service requiring them to maintain the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was 
no evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense 
testified that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the 
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road from 
the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year 
during the decades of the 60's and 70's. 
26. That the testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest service and 
adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting (during the 
winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters, 
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and 
maintenance of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. 
27. That vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and motorcycles all at various times traveled the 
entire length of the Road ending on forest service property. 
28. That the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that even if it is concluded (which 
this Court does not) that the Road was gated and locked in the late 50fs and early 60fs as 
described by the Butler's, the Road was used as necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that time. 
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That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified 
engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that 
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was 
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court 
finds that the width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder 
on each side. 
The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline of the Road generated from a survey 
of the Road itself was introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by counsel 
for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different township or range than the legal 
description of the Defendants' properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that 
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to establish their respective 
boundaries as the center of the roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary 
line agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this Court to determine if there 
is a conflict in the two positions or how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The 
Court merely determines, today, that the Road as it presently exists is a public highway, 20 
feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each side. 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was 
also substantial testimony that many people were unable to travel the Road after that time 
without gaining permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one 
exhibit shows a sign created by the County which allowed travel past the Butler gate, 
although admonishing travelers to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the 
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forest service. As noted above there have historically been gates across the Road for 
purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern 
and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
32. That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 1997 it has been 
locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence 
was presented to clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road 
was obstructed and how many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to 
obtain the penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of days the 
Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service and testimony that 
persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 or 7 years does not meet that 
burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable precision the number of 
days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty 
can be imposed. 
33. The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to 
a national roadway for decades and generations. 
34. That Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to recover reasonable costs 
of court to be established by affidavit. 
CONCLUSIONS OF TAW 
The Court hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law relying in whole or in part upon 
the foregoing Findings of Fact: 
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1. That the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public because it has been 
continuously used a public thoroughfare for a period often years, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §72-5-104 (and its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route 
to be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
often years. ...Once the technical provision of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is 
a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder 
County. 962 P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Hebert City Corp. v. Simpson. 942 
P.2d 307 at 310 (Utah 1997). That Plaintiffs successfully proved each of the foregoing 
factors by clear and convincing evidence. 
3. That there is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the public. 
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 
P.2d 445 at 449 (Utah 1981). 
4. That continuous use is established where "the public has made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Campbell. 
962 P.2d at 809. The "use may be continuous though not constant...provided it occurred as 
often as the claimant had occasion to choose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." 
Id at 809 (citing Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
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5. That Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property owners to 
restrict sportsman access to their property by posting: 
"Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are 
displayed at all comers, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, 
and rights-of-way entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire 
exterior side must be painted." 
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the 
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would 
have to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of 
private property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted 
posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the 
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road 
from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what 
the plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road. 
6. That the term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority 
defines the term as a "street or way opening at both ends into another street or public 
highway, so that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul 
de sac, which is open only at one end." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law 
Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1946. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public 
use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by 
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all 
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as 
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the situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid 
out as a pubic highway by public authority." 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929). 
The court has also stated that a c"thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is 
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of 
passage." Gilmore v. Carter. 15 U.2d 280, 291 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964). 
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to 
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were 
reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a 
highway. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of 
course the Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Canyon 
Corner Road" could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, 
only that the issue could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a 
substantially different posture. 
7. That the Road was a public thoroughfare before 1980. 
8. That having determined that the Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public before 
1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and 
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). 
9. That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe travel is 26 feet, 
including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) foot shoulders on each side. 
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10. That Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains 
a structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days 
upon notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover . . . 
. (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." 
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable costs of court as the prevailing party to be established by 
affidavit. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered, 
adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. That the Road from the gate at the Butler residence to the Uinta National Forest Boundary 
is hereby declared a public highway within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (and 
its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That the location of Road is where it presently exists. 
3. That the scope (or width) of the right-of-way of the Road west of the gate at the Butler 
Residence is 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side and a 20 foot travel width, the 
centerline of which is the center of the exiting Bennie Creek Road. 
4. That the Defendants and their successors and assigns shall not take any action that blocks, 
locks, or otherwise interferes with public access to the Road. 
5. That the Defendants immediately remove any and all structures, blockages, gates, fences or 
anything that blocks, locks, or otherwise interferes with public access across the Road. 
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6. That Plaintiff Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Defendants 
Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day from July 29,1997 to the date of 
the order, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment is hereby denied. 
& 
That Plaintiffs are^warded judgment, joint and several, against Defendants Randy Butler and 
Donna Butler, Blaine and Linda Evans for reasonable costs of courtdetermined by a verified 
/ 
bill of c&sts pursuant to URCP Rule 54 in the amount of $
 : for Utah County 
V /£* and $ for the State of Utah. 
8. Plaintiff Utah County is ordered to record this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in the records of the Utah County Recorder. 
9. For interest on the Judgement at the legal rate from date of the entry of judgment. 
DATED this f(p day of T^JO^. ^2Q 
NOTICE OF O 
Notice of objections must be submitted to the Court and^&ise&mthm five (5) days after 
service, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ ' a y of! M'/ , 2004, 
to the following: 
MARK E. ARNOLD 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
57 West 200 South #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 / / / - , 
L:\Rob\Civi! LitigatiorABennie Creek Road\Pleadings\Findings an4£Dnd^sions-Final.wpd 
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ADDENDUM C 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
fl Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and 
Linda Evans appeal the trial court's conclusion that Bennie Creek 
Road (the Road) is a public highway under Utah Code section 72-5-
104(1) (the Dedication Statute). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104(1) (2001). Utah County cross-appeals the trial court!s 
decision to deny statutory damages caused by Defendants' refusal 
to remove a gate after receiving service of notice. We affirm in 
part and remand for a determination of statutory damages owed to 
Utah County. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 The Road runs west from U.S. Highway 89 into the Uinta 
National Forest (the National Forest) , providing access to 
camping areas, hiking trails, and the Nebo Loop. Portions of the 
Road cross Defendants' properties before reaching the National 
Forest. In 1996, Defendants prevented public access to the Road 
by erecting a metal gate. On July 29, 1997, the Utah County 
Board of Commissioners served Defendants with notice ordering the 
removal of the gate from the Road. Because Defendants refused to 
remove the gate, Utah County and the State of Utah Department of 
Natural Resources (Plaintiffs) brought this action to have the 
Road declared a public highway and to force the removal of the 
metal gate. 
f3 Following an eight-day bench trial in June 2004, the court 
concluded that the Road had been dedicated to public use long ago 
and ordered the gate removed. At trial, the court heard 
testimony from previous and current landowners, various users of 
the Road, National Forest workers, and public employees assigned 
to maintain the Road. The testimony conflicted as to the prior 
use of gates, placement of no-trespassing signs, and ownership 
reactions to public use of the road. After evaluating the 
credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the trial 
court ultimately determined that the Road had been open to public 
use from the mid-1920s until about 1980. 
f4 The trial court issued a memorandum decision directing 
Plaintiffs to prepare a final order containing factual findings 
and conclusions of law consistent with those outlined in the 
memorandum. Defendants objected to the proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order submitted by Plaintiffs, and 
requested a hearing. The trial court signed the proposed order 
without holding a hearing. Defendants now appeal. 
f^5 Despite concluding that the Road had been dedicated to 
jpublic use and that Defendants did not remove the gate after 
receiving proper notice, the trial court refused to award Utah 
County its demand for statutory damages. In refusing to make the 
award, the trial court ruled that conflicting evidence in the 
record as to whether the gate was locked prevented the court from 
being able to accurately calculate damages. Utah County cross-
appeals the refusal to award statutory damages. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f6 Defendants argue that the trial court erred by determining 
that the Road was dedicated to public use under Utah Code section 
72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). " [W]hen 
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a public 
highway has been established . . . , we review the decision for 
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correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its 
application of the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). 
f7 Defendants also assert that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to rule on their objections to the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In challenging 
a discretionary decision of the trial court, Defendants must 
demonstrate that the court exceeded the measure of discretion the 
law affords it. This is done by showing that there is "no 
reasonable basis for the [court's] decision." Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
1|8 In its cross-appeal, Utah County claims that in light of 
Defendants' refusal to remove the gate after receiving proper 
notice in 1997, Utah County is entitled to an award for statutory 
damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 (2001) . We review a 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial court. See State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. PUBLIC ROAD 
%9 For a road to be dedicated to public use, it must be 
"continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104; see also Simpson, 942 P. 2d at 
310. Defendants claim that (a) the use relied upon by the trial 
court was not public use, and that (b) the use was not continuous 
(c) for a period of ten years. 
a. Public Use 
HlO Defendants argue that because most of Plaintiffs1 witnesses 
used the Road as trespassers, the witnesses should not be 
considered members of the public for purposes of determining that 
the Road was dedicated to public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104(1). Defendants, however, provide no legal support for their 
argument, nor a compelling reason why trespassers cannot be 
considered members of the public. 
fll In fact, "under Utah law . . . permissive use cannot result 
in either adverse possession or dedication of private property to 
the public." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P. 2d 806, 809 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 
UT App 104, f 19, 132 P. 3d 687 (holding that permissive use may not 
be considered in a public dedication determination) . Under the 
Dedication Statute, public use cannot include permissive use, nor 
can it include use by "owners of adjoining property." Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
i 
Defendants ' proposed interpretation would render the Dedication 
Statute ineffective because no use could ever constitute public 
use. To give the Dedication Statute proper effect, we hold that 
non-permissive use must be considered public use. We therefore 
agree with the trial court that trespassers are members of the 
"public" for purposes of determining whether the Dedication 
Statute has been satisfied. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2001). 
b. Continuous Use 
Kl2 Defendants claim that, even if the trial court properly-
defined public use, the trial court erred in concluding that the 
Road was used continuously because there were gates along the 
road and seasonal weather conditions made the Road impassable at 
times. 
fl3 While there was conflicting testimony at trial regarding the 
status and purpose of these gates, we are not in a position to 
closely scrutinize the factual findings of the trial court in 
public thoroughfare dedication cases. See Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997) (holding that factual 
issues in public dedication cases do not lend themselves to close 
review). Therefore, unless the findings of fact are clearly 
unsupported by the record, we will seek only to apply the trial 
court's factual findings to the law of abandonment and public 
dedication. 
fl4 This court has interpreted the Dedication Statute as 
requiring "continuous and uninterrupted use of a road over ten 
years where 'the public, even though not consisting of a great 
many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use . . . as 
often as they found it convenient or necessary.'" Campbell, 962 
P.2d at 809 (emphasis added) (omission in original) (citation 
omitted). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant. . . . 
([P]rovided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or 
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id. 
(omission in original) (emphasis added) (quotations and citation 
omitted) . 
Hl5 Even though it appears that there were instances when 
seasonal weather rendered the Road temporarily impassible, the 
trial court found that the Road was used by the public whenever 
it was convenient or necessary. Additionally, the court held 
that the gates in question were generally unlocked from about 
1925 until 1980 and were used merely to restrict the travel of 
livestock, not people. These times of impasse amount to "mere 
intermission[s] " of public use. Id. We therefore agree with the 
trial court's conclusion that the Road was in continuous use by 
the public for an extended period of time. 
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c. Period of Ten Years 
1fl6 Defendants argue that the trial court erred because it 
failed to identify an exact ten-year period during which the Road 
was continuously used. Language in the Dedication Statute 
requires a finding of continuous use for at least ten years, and 
therefore permits a finding of public dedication based on a time 
period greater than ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2001). The trial court determined that the Road was 
continuously used by the public from about 1925 until 1980, or 
approximately fifty-five years. This fifty-five year span of 
public use clearly exceeds the statutory minimum requirement of 
ten years. 
1(17 Defendants1 arguments on this issue imply a challenge to the 
trial court1s factual findings that the Road was continuously 
open to the public for a sufficient period of time. By failing 
to offer case law supporting their position and merely pointing 
to conflicting evidence in the record concerning the time period 
issue, Defendants simply invite this court to meddle with the 
trial court's findings of fact. Again, we will not closely 
scrutinize the factual findings of a trial court when reviewing 
public dedication cases; we seek only to ensure that the trial 
court has properly applied those facts to the law. See Simpson, 
942 P.2d at 309-10. Therefore, we agree with the trial court 
that Plaintiffs properly demonstrated that the Road was 
continuously used by the public for at least ten years. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). 
II. OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER 
fl8 After the trial court's decision, Defendants filed 
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order, with a request for a hearing, arguing insufficiency of 
iithe evidence. Despite Defendants' objections, the trial court 
entered the proposed findings and order without another hearing. 
Defendants argue that in ruling on their objections without 
holding a hearing, the trial court abused its discretion. We 
disagree. 
fl9 The trial court is afforded great latitude in determining 
whether a hearing will be held on non-dispositive motions. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). Under rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court "may hold a hearing on any motion" but 
is not required to do so. Id. The proposed order eventually 
adopted by the trial court was sufficiently similar to the 
memorandum decision to provide a reasonable basis on which the 
trial court could decide to deny a hearing on the objections. 
Because Defendant's motion was simply an objection to the factual 
findings of the trial court, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on Defendants' 
R 
objection. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993) . 
III. DAMAGES 
1f20 In its cross-appeal, Utah County challenges the trial 
court's ruling that it is not entitled to statutory damages for 
the time the metal gate remained across the Road after Utah 
County served Defendants notice. Utah County argues that 
Defendants' failure to remove the gate after receiving proper 
service of notice automatically results in the statutory penalty. 
Under section 72-7-104, when an installation is not removed 
within ten days after service of notice is completed, " [a] 
highway authority may recover: (a) the costs and expenses 
incurred in removing the installation, serving notice, and the 
costs of a lawsuit if any; and (b) [ten dollars] for each day the 
installation remain[s] within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) (2001). More than nine 
years have passed since Defendants received service of notice, 
and the gate has apparently not been removed. 
1(21 Utah County argues that it met its burden to show that 
service was completed and that the gate remained in place 
throughout this litigation. Utah County claims that the trial 
court did not have discretion to deny statutory damages. We 
agree. Pursuant to section 72-7-104(5), when the highway 
authority is granted a judgment after the removal of an 
installation is contested, it is entitled to the remedies 
referred to above. See id. § 72-7-104(5). It is clear from the 
record that Defendants did not remove the gate subsequent to 
receiving notice from Utah County. The record reflects that the 
trial court was reticent to award Utah County these costly 
damages. In declining to award damages, the trial court pointed 
to conflicting testimony regarding whether the gate was locked, 
despite finding that the Road was indeed a public highway, that 
notice to remove the gate was properly served, and that the gate 
was not removed. 
1(22 We conclude that the installation of the gate clearly falls 
under the proscribed structures "of any kind or character" 
regardless of whether it was locked. Id. § 72-7-104(1). The 
record shows that the trial court gave much consideration to 
whether the gate remained locked after Defendants received 
notice. Such a factual determination is inapplicable to section 
72-7-104(4), which concerns itself only with installations across 
public highways, not whether the installations are locked. See 
id. § 72-7-104(4) . Because Utah County made a proper showing 
that the gate remained in place after notice was completed, the 
trial court should have awarded section 72-7-104(4) damages. 
1(23 We recognize that this decision will, in effect, award Utah 
County substantial statutory damages despite its failure to take 
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advantage of the self-help remedies available to it under section 
72-7-104(1). See id. § 72-7-104(1). We also recognize that this 
decision will force landowners to think twice about deciding 
whether to remove similar installations after receiving notice 
from a highway authority--even when the landowner intends to 
challenge the highway authority's decisions in court. The ten 
dollar per day penalty begins to accrue ten days after notice is 
completed, and continues to accrue until the installation is 
removed. The statute simply does not provide for a tolling of 
the penalty during a legal dispute between a landowner and a 
highway authority, nor does it limit the total amount a highway 
authority may recover. We are therefore constrained to reward 
the highway authority1s decision to not remove the installation 
and conclude that damages should be calculated from ten days 
after completion of service of notice until such time as the gate 
is removed. Surely the legislature did not anticipate such a 
long gap between the completion of service of notice and removal 
of the installation. But the plain language of the statute 
prevents us from interpreting the provision for statutory damages 
otherwise. See id. § 72-7-104(1)-(5). 
CONCLUSION 
<|24 The trial court properly applied its factual conclusions to 
the law of abandonment and public dedication of a highway in 
finding that the Road is a public highway. The challenges by 
Defendants are largely an attack on the trial court's factual 
findings, which in public dedication cases, we will not closely 
scrutinize. However, the trial court erred by failing to award 
statutory damages after concluding that the gate remained across 
the Road well after Utah County completed service of notice. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Road is a 
public highway under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), and remand 
i the case for a calculation of statutory damages consistent with 
this opinion and Utah Code section 72-7-104. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
f 2 5 WE CONCUR: 
sytte 
Carolyn^. McHugh 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on January 3, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
'granted as to the following issues: 
1. Whether trespassing may constitute a publdc use pursuant 
to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. 
2. Whether the district court erred in its determination 
that the public had continuously used the road at issue in this 
case according to the requirements of the Dedication Statute. 
3. Whether the district court failed to designate a 
specific ten-year period of continuous use and, if so, whether 
that failure constituted reversible error. 
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4) to the facts of this case. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Dated K flow 
-f 
For The Court 
C h r i s t i n e M. Durham 
Chief J u s t i c e 
